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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-3721 
____________ 
 
GERALD MICKIE, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-04694) 
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois 
____________ 
 
Submitted September 9, 2019  
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 12, 2019) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Gerald Mickie appeals the District Court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner 
of Social Security’s denial of supplemental security income (SSI) under Title XVI of the 
Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1381. We will affirm. 
I1 
 When he first applied for SSI in December 2013, Mickie was 57 years old and had 
previously worked as an electrician helper.2 Mickie reported struggling with back pain 
and neuropathy. In his amended application, Mickie alleged a disability onset date of 
August 29, 2011. When the Commissioner denied that application, Mickie requested a 
hearing. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held three hearings, adjourning in August 
2015 and rescheduling in January 2016 to allow Mickie time to obtain additional medical 
records. Mickie appeared at each hearing, represented by counsel. Following his third 
hearing, the ALJ denied Mickie’s claim under the Act. 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over legal conclusions 
reached by the Commissioner,” and “review the Commissioner’s factual findings for 
‘substantial evidence.’” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 
2011).  
2 In his application, Mickie identified himself as an electrician. At his 
administrative hearing, the state vocational expert identified Mickie as an “electrician 
helper” because, despite his “electrical work,” he was not licensed as an electrician. App. 
158–161. 
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 The ALJ determined that Mickie failed at step five of the disability determination 
process, which requires that a claimant not be able to perform work existing in the 
national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 
616 (3d Cir. 2014). She based her decision on medical evidence, opinion evidence, and 
hearing testimony consistent with “the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform 
medium [exertion] work” under certain limitations. App. 7–11. Because that RFC allows 
Mickie to find alternative employment in the national economy, the ALJ found him “not 
disabled.” App. 12–13. Mickie appealed the ALJ’s decision and tried to introduce new 
evidence (medical records dated after the relevant period). When the Appeals Council 
denied his request for review, Mickie appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the 
ALJ’s findings. Mickie timely appealed.  
II 
 Mickie essentially claims the ALJ made two mistakes in her analysis. First, the 
ALJ’s RFC medium work determination contradicted the medical record, as it permitted 
greater exertion than the light work assessed by Mickie’s state consultative examiner and 
reviewing physician. Second, Mickie argues the ALJ erred by “fail[ing] to acknowledge 
or discuss the CT scan evidence,” which allegedly “contradicted the x-ray 
evidence . . . cited in support of her decision.” Mickie Br. 7. That CT scan, he claims, 
provides “pertinent and probative evidence inconsistent with [the ALJ’s] findings.” 
Mickie Br. 2. Because the ALJ did not explain why she did not discuss that CT scan, 
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Mickie maintains the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by substantial 
evidence.  
 We disagree. “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the 
threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more 
than a mere scintilla.’ It means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 
139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citations omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The ALJ found Mickie capable of medium work after 
identifying and evaluating copious evidence consistent with that finding—including 
records of medical examination and imaging, as well as physician testimony. Because 
assessments by Mickie’s appointed consultative examiner and state reviewing physician 
contrasted with “completely normal findings on [his physical] exam” and his “[medical] 
record as a whole,” the ALJ gave their opinions less weight. App. 11; see 20 C.F.R. § 
416.927(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a 
whole, the more weight [the ALJ] will give to that medical opinion.”). When faced with 
conflicting medical evidence, we have said that “the ALJ is entitled to weigh all evidence 
in making its finding.” Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2011). The ALJ’s 
consideration of Mickie’s entire record and decision to more heavily weigh Mickie’s 
physical exam satisfy the requirements of substantial evidence. So we decline to disturb 
 5 
 
the ALJ’s determination that Mickie was not disabled because he could perform medium 
work. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. 
Mickie also urges us to overturn the ALJ’s decision because it did not clearly 
discuss his July 2013 CT scan. But we are “not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or 
impose [our] own factual determinations” when reviewing the ALJ’s findings. Chandler 
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Burns v. Barnhart, 
312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). That includes the ALJ’s treatment of this scan. The 
ALJ’s analysis demonstrates thorough consideration of the medical evidence pertaining 
to Mickie’s back impairment and resulting limitations. Mickie’s contention that the ALJ 
ignored his July 2013 CT scan is incorrect: her decision cites to exhibit “2F” in the 
record, which includes the scan. So we perceive no error in the ALJ’s disability 
determination on this basis.   
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
